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Abstract: This study aimed to determine how hostile media perception theory would 
change under selective exposure phenomenon. The 2008 National Annenberg Election 
Survey (NAES) data were used for analysis. First, the results revealed that selective 
exposure phenomenon existed during the 2008 presidential lection throughout all types 
of media. Second, it was found that people who selectively exposed themselves to the 
politically congruent campaign media program tended to perceive the media coverage as 
in favor of their supporting candidate. Finally, the results showed that unlike the previous 
findings, people with strong partisanship tended to perceive the campaign media 
coverage as in favor of their supporting candidate. The theoretical and practical 
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Selective exposure phenomenon refers to the audience member’s selection of 
information that is agreeable to their predispositins (Klapper, 1960; Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, &Gaudet, 1948). In their landmark article, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 
(1948) found that people tend to expose themselves sel ctively to partisan propaganda 
that supports their pre-existing positions. The phenomenon was highlighted and 
recognized as a factor that could lead to large-scale change in existing theories (Bennet & 
Iyengar, 2010; Klapper, 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948). They argued that 
this phenomenon limits the effects of media in reinforcing, rather than altering, people’s 
previous attitude (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948). 
This phenomenon was dormant in the middle of the 20th century, as the three 
media networks, namely, NBC, ABC, and CBS, dominated round 80% of the media 
markets and provided homogeneous content (Bennet&Iyngar, 2008; Webster, 2010). 
However, in the 21st century, when the development of communication technology and 
the growth in the number and variety of news outlets created a fragmented information 
environment, selective exposure phenomenon was again documented (Lawrence, Sides, 




The resurgence of this phenomenon drew attention to the effects of selective 
exposure on existing theories. Bennet and Iyengar (2008) argued that media messages 
can only serve to reinforce prior predispositions, as audiences try to see what they think is 
in favor of their beliefs, whereas other scholars argued that selective exposure 
phenomenon fosters the explanatory power of persuasion theories (e.g., Holbert, Garrett, 
Laurel, & Gleason, 2010). However, compared with the abundance of anecdotal debates, 
little empirical evidence supports the influence of this phenomenon on existing theories. 
The current study pays attention to change in hostile media perception theory, as the 
selective exposure phenomenon seemingly negates its premise. Hostile media perception 
or hostile media effect refers to the tendency of people highly involved in an issue to see 
presumably balanced media coverage of that issue as biased against their point of view 
(Gunther, Miller, &Liebhart, 2009). Based on the above definition, hostile media 
perception assumes balanced news. In other words, hostile media perception has been 
examined to determine the psychological mechanism or the different perceptions of 
people when facing balanced news. Although this assumption may have been valid when 
balanced news was arguably the norm (Gunther, Edgerly, Akin, &Broesch, 2012), the 
new media environment characterized by selective exposure phenomenon makes it seem 
outdated. According to selective exposure theory, when media outlets provide fragmented 
information, and audiences seek information that supports their views, the premise of 
hostile media perception, namely, balanced news, could be invalidated.  
Therefore, how would hostile media perception change if people selectively 




news? Is hostile media perception still observed in a more naturalistic rather than 
experimental setting? This study seeks to provide answers to these questions.  
This study uses 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) data. The 
survey measured media usage, political opinions, and beliefs of electorate in the United 
States throughout the 2008 presidential election, and thus the data contain indicators of 
people’s perception of campaign news coverage. Moreover, sharp conflicts surrounding 
the presidential election have arisen among partisans, making such conflict a good focus 
for this study. Several studies have been conducted on hostile media perception in the 
context of the elections (Huge & Glynn, 2010; Richardson, Huddy, & Morgan, 2008). 
This study can contribute to the theoretical development of the communication 
academic field in two ways. It is the first attempt at providing empirical evidence for 
debates regarding the effects of selective exposure phenomenon on the existing theory. 








REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Selective exposure phenomenon 
Selective exposure phenomenon was discovered over half a century ago. 
Lazarsfeld et al. (1948) examined how mass media influe ces the people’s choice in 
voting for the president. They found that electorates selectively expose themselves to 
media propaganda. According to the study, during the presidential election in 1940, 
three-fourths of the respondents paid attention to media propaganda from their own party, 
whereas only 20% of the respondents exposed themselves to propaganda from the 
opposition. Furthermore, Democrats tended to listen to the radio more to obtain 
information for decision making, whereas Republicans used newspapers more, as the 
majority of the nation’s newspapers openly supported R publican candidates at that time. 
The authors pointed out the availability of news sources and personal predispositions of 
the audience as reasons for this phenomenon. 
A decade later, Klapper (1960) conceptualized this p enomenon as “selective 
exposure” (p.18), and argued that because of the selectivity of audiences, “persuasive 




an agent of change” (p.15), marking the start of the so-called minimal effect era and 
finishing the strong effect era. Around the same time, several empirical studies lent 
support for the selective exposure phenomenon (e.g. Schramm & Carter, 1959). 
Dissonance theory gave theoretical context to the phenomenon, suggesting that attitude-
inconsistent information induces mental discomfort, called dissonance (Festinger, 1964). 
As dissonance is perceived as an aversive arousal, people are motivated to reduce this 
state. One of the best ways for reducing this state is that people would selectively expose 
themselves to attitude-consistent information supporting their views and neglect 
inconsistent information (Frey & Rosch, 1984). 
However, this minimal effect era soon led to another strong effect era. From the 
1960s to the 1980s, two important changes in the media environment and in social 
structure allowed scholars to again posit the strong media effect on audiences: a) almost 
all people were exposed to the same information from one of the three network 
newscasts, and b) the social network that exerted influence on information filtering grew 
weak (Bennet & Iyengar, 2008). The implication is that the monopolistic media 
environment and the mass society, in which interpersonal relationships no longer 
influence people’s public affair, brought people no other alternative for seeking 
information but to rely on the media. As Bennet andIyengar (2008) described, more than 
80% of audiences primarily depended on the three evning news broadcasts to keep 
abreast of public affairs. Therefore, the environmet created by the three network news 
environment constrain audiences from seeking information , and force audiences to be 
exposed to homogeneous information (Valentino, Banks, Hutchings, & Davis, 2009). In 




media outlets that were aligned with their views. During that era, Chaffee and Miyo 
(1983) conducted an experiment but could not find ay evidence for selective exposure. 
They concluded that reinforcement of prior beliefs “may have been well suited to an 
earlier political era” (p. 34).  
However, radical change in the media environment in the 21st century led to the 
resurgence of the selective exposure phenomenon. With the invention of the Internet, 
development of cable channels, and explosion of media outlets, people were exposed to a 
totally different media environment compared with that only two decades ago (Bennet & 
Iyengar, 2008). Most of all, the availability of media channels had increased. People 
could easily access thousands of online sites and hu reds of TV channels to obtain 
information. The average household could receive over 100 channels of programming in 
2004, compared with only 33 channels in 1990 (Webster, 2005).  
Aside from availability, contents have been as diverse as the number of channels. 
In this multi-channel environment, media outlets have created and provided diverse 
information to be competitive (Bennet & Iyengar, 2008). Each channel tries to establish a 
distinctive brand by providing differentiated program, leading to a strong correlation 
between content and channel. Thus, as many content analyses have shown, Fox News 
characterizes itself as having a strong ideological slant toward conservatives, whereas 
MSNBC goes the opposite direction (Groeling, 2008; Groseclose & Milyo, 2005; 
Holtzman et al., 2011). Webster (2005) proposed three characteristics of this new era: a) 
diversity of programming, b) correlation between cotent and channel, and c) differential 
availability of channels. He argued that this new media environment leads to information 




three or four viewing options, becomes more widely distributed” (p. 367). Data from the 
national survey clearly show the tendency for fragmentation in the news environment. 
The regular audience for nightly network news, which dominated the media market in the 
1980s, declined markedly through the 1990s, whereas the hare ratio of cable TV 
increased. Thus, only 27% of audiences regularly watch the nightly network news on 
CBS, ABC, or NBC, compared with 34% who watch cable news channels (PEW, 2012). 
Scholars did not hesitate to point to this fragmented information environment as a 
reason for the revival of the selective exposure phnomenon. For example, Iyengar and 
Hahn (2009) argued that in the fragmented media enviro ment, “partisans gravitate to 
alternative sources perceived as more congenial to their preferences” (p. 22). They 
explained that the enormous and diverse supply of inf rmation and availability make it 
far easier for the audience to select information that exposes them to attitude-consistent 
information. 
However, disputes have long existed on whether selective exposure really exists, 
as several empirical studies returned outcomes that differed from those anticipated by the 
theory. For example, Sears and Freedman (1965) condu ted a mock jury experiment to 
test the theory. Participants were led to read an abbreviated report of a trial on juvenile 
crime and to vote on the verdict. Then, participants were asked to choose which among 
five articles they most wanted to read, as some of the articles were consonant with a pro-
conviction vote and others were dissonant. Only 43.1% of subjects chose an article that 
supported their first position. A very similar experiment was conducted one year later, 
whereby 50% of the subjects chose material that was con onant with their first opinion 




Based on these results, Sears and Freedman (1967) argued  that selective exposure 
was not necessarily motivated by any preference for supportive information, but was 
influenced by many other factors, such as personal network or utility. For example, 
businessmen or lawyers are likely to attend Republican political meetings that could 
provide useful friendship and information. Stockbrokers read the Wall Street Journal not 
because of their political predisposition but because of its extensive coverage of financial 
and business news. They described this phenomenon as “de facto” selective exposure (p. 
196). The controversy surrounding selective exposure phenomenon persists today. 
However, a growing body of evidence has supported th  validity of selective exposure 
phenomenon in various topics. For example, Stroud (2008) found that politically 
motivated selective exposure exists in all forms of mass media, including TV, radio, 
newspaper, and political websites. Lawrence et al. (2010) found that blog readers 
gravitate toward blogs that coincide with their political beliefs. Additionally, selective 
exposure occurs among film audiences (Stroud, 2007).  
 
Selective Exposure and its Impacts 
An important issue surrounding selective exposure phenomenon concerns its 
effects on existing theories. A consistent argument is that selective exposure limits the 
persuasive effect of media message. For instance, Lazarsfeld (1949) argued that because 
people turn to propaganda that reaffirms their original decision, selective exposure only 
serves to reinforce, rather than alter people’s previous attitudes. Klapper (1960) 




Iyengar (2008) argued that selective exposure leads to a return of the minimal effect era. 
They explained,  
as media audiences devolve into smaller, like-minded subsets of the electorate, it 
becomes less likely that media messages will do anything other than reinforce prior 
predispositions. Most media users will rarely find themselves in the path of attitude-
discrepant information. The increasing level of selective exposure based on partisan 
preference thus presages a new era of minimal consequences, at least insofar as 
persuasive effects are concerned (p. 725). 
However, other scholars refute this perspective, arguing instead that selective 
exposure could foster attitudinal change. For example, Holbert et al. (2010) proposed an 
elaboration likelihood model (ELM) as framework foranticipating change in existing 
theories, and argued that persuasive media message increases, rather than reduces, 
influence on the audience. They explained that in the new media era, an audience who 
can choose a media source in light of personal political predisposition is likely to be 
vulnerable to persuasive message because the audience would have motivation and ability 
to consume the persuasive message. According to the ELM model, the motivation and 
ability of consumers are the two factors causing them to be engaged in the persuasive 
process (Petty & Cacioppo, 1996).  
An ongoing debate surrounds the effect of selective exposure phenomenon on 
existing theories. Selective exposure certainly affects existing theories regardless of 
whether the effect attenuates the power of the theories r not. If so, what effect does 




Hostile Media Perception 
Vallone et al. (1986) exposed both pro-Arab and pro-Is aeli students to 
presumably neutral news coverage of the Middle Eastconflict, and they found that the 
pro-Arab students perceived the news coverage biased toward Israel, whereas the pro-
Israeli students perceived the news coverage biased toward Arabs. They called this 
finding as hostile media phenomenon. Their finding is significant because it contradicts 
the results of previous studies. Before their documentation, research with a similar 
experimental setting has consistently reported biased assimilation, which refers to the 
tendency for partisans to interpret information as supporting their point of view (Lord, 
Ross & Lepper, 1979).  
Gunther and Schmitt (2004) pointed out that the contradictory phenomenon is 
derived from the differences in experimental settings, and found that hostile media 
perception is elicited when participants watch broad-reaching sources, such as news 
media, rather than low-reaching sources, such as a student’s essay. They concluded that 
hostile media perception could depend on how people perceive the reach of sources. 
Building on the third-person effect, they explained that people tend to think that other 
people are more vulnerable to slanted media coverage, making the former group process 
information in a defensive mode and generating hostile media perception rather than 
biased assimilation. Gunther et al. (2009) explained,  
individuals believed the slant of media content could broadly influence public 
attitudes, and their perceptions of public opinion changed accordingly. Concerns 




processing mode in which disagreeable information wuld seem to be especially 
prominent or prevalent and hence the overall content judged to be unfairly biased. (p. 
749). 
As to why hostile media perception occurs, the dominant explanation is that people’s 
involvement and attitude toward a certain issue could influence their assessment of news 
coverage on that issue (Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Gunther, Miller, & Liebhart, 2009; 
Gunther & Schmitt, 2004; Schmitt, Gunther, & Liebhart, 2004). Drawing on social 
judgment theory, this line of explanation regards ho tile media perception as a contrast 
effect. Social judgment theory views people’s attitude to be composed of three latitudes: 
(a) latitude of acceptance, (b) latitude of non-commit ent, and (c) latitude of rejection 
(Sherif & Hovland, 1961). The contrast effect arises when a message is placed in the 
latitude of rejection, whereas the assimilation effect arises when a message is placed in 
the latitude of acceptance. Contrast effect refers to the people’s tendency to judge a 
message to be farther from their own views than it ctually is (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). 
Thus, when the contrast effect arises, people tend to disagree with a message and not be 
persuaded by it. Distinguishing between contrast and assimilation effects depends on the 
degree of ego-involvement that people have with a certain issue. Social judgment theory 
explains that people who have high ego-involvement with an issue are likely to reject a 
persuasive message about that issue, placing the messag  in the latitude of rejection 
(Sherif & Hovland, 1961).  
Involvement has been variously conceptualized in hostile media perception 
studies (Choi et al., 2009). Choi et al. (2009) classified the concept of involvement and 




et al., 2002; Gunther & Schmitt, 2004), while others mployed opinion extremity 
(Christen & Gunther, 2003; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Gunther & Christen, 2002). 
Also, they found that political party attachment or p litical ideology was used as an 
indicator of involvement in the context of political issue (e.g. Huge & Glynn, 2010; 
Richardson et al., 2008).  
 The importance of involvement has been supported through many studies. For 
instance Vallone et al. (1985) first documented hostile media perception with strong 
partisan, from pro-Arab and pro-Israeli students, in the context of the Middle East 
conflict. Also, Christen, Kannaovakun, and Gunther (1998) conducted an experiment in 
the context of the 1997 UPS strike with highly partisan participants, that is, UPS 
managers and UPS workers, and found clear hostile media perception. Also, in a 
gubernatorial election, highly involved Republican and Democrat groups displayed 
strong hostile media perception (Huge & Glynn, 2010). On the other hand, Giner-Sorolla 
and Chaiken (1994) recruited participants from college classes, rather than from partisan 
groups, and measured their perception of news coverage on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Interestingly, this experiment produced only partial support for hostile media 
perception. They explained that the result can be attributed to the use of participants with 
low involvement. Thus, involvement was pointed out as a necessary condition for hostile 
media perception studies.  
Extensive research has replicated such hostile media perception in various topics 
and settings. Meanwhile, several studies have focused on the theoretical mechanism of 
hostile media perception and have contributed to elaborating the theory (Gunther & 




Choi, Yang & Chang, 2009). Through those studies, other predictors on hostile media 
perception, as well as involvement, were found,  such as prior belief about media 
credibility (Arpan & Raney, 2003; Giner-Sorrola & Chaiken, 1994) and interpersonal 
communication network (Eveland & Shah, 2003), to name a few. For example, Arpan 
and Raney (2003) investigated hostile media perception in a sports news context, and 
found that people displayed more hostile perception to a news article reported by a rival 
town newspaper, compared with that of a hometown newspaper. They argued that the 
people’s prior belief that the rival town newspaper is less likely to report truth favoring 
their hometown team was what leads to hostile media perception. 
In addition to predictors, it was found that hostile media perception could occur in 
forms other than the news. Richardson, Huddy, and Morgan (2008) found that the 
political debate moderator in the 2004 Bush-Kerry presidential election debate brought 
hostile media perception to the audience. They documented that people saw the debate 
moderator as biased against their preferred candidate, but they perceived that their 
candidate won the debate. For the presence of such empirical evidence and theoretical 
refinement, hostile media perception was acknowledged as one of the most robust 
phenomena in the communication field (Huge & Glynn, 2010).  
Hostile Media Perception in the Fragmented Information Era 
As indicated in its definition, hostile media perception occurs not because of the 
actual slant of news coverage, but because of the audi nce’s own beliefs or attitude. 
Hostile media perception has been demonstrated in the context of balanced news 




selective exposure theory indicates, the appearance of opinionated media outlets and 
audience’s selection of information on the basis of their beliefs invalidate the assumption 
of balanced news. This change in media environment results in conflict and 
incompatibility between these two phenomena. If the theory is correct, the existence of 
hostile media perception is not possible, as people can be exposed to slanted information 
from the outset, which negate the basis of hostile media perception. On the other hand, if 
hostile media perception is correct, then selective exposure phenomenon makes no sense 
as people would not find any information that supports their views. Nonetheless, selective 
exposure and hostile media perception have been succe sfully observed in previous 
works, although the coexistence of two phenomena is unl kely from the standpoint of 
ecological validity. The methodological artifact appears to be one of the reasons for the 
coexistence of two phenomena. Almost all laboratory experiments on hostile media 
perception assume the coexistence of balanced articles on a certain issue and audience 
who seek those articles. However, these experimental settings are very different from the 
consumption of information in the real world (Bennet & Iyengar, 2010). In other words, 
the presence of hostile media perception in experimental settings may not correspond to 
media consumption in the fragmented information enviro ment. 
This contradictory situation begs the following questions. How will hostile media 
perception be changed when the methodological artifacts are eliminated? Is hostile media 
perception still observed in the new media environme t, in which audiences are exposed 
to news coverage agreeable to their points of view? Predicting the answer to these 
questions is difficult given the lack of empirical evidence. However, several studies have 




exposed participants to explicitly slanted news coverage. They showed pro-animal 
slanted news to two oppositional groups: animal rights activists and primate-research 
supporters. They found that partisans on each side of the issue perceived the news 
coverage to be biased toward the animal rights activist group, but both groups perceived 
the coverage as more unfavorable toward their position than others. In other words, 
primate-research supporters saw the news as significa tly more biased against primate 
research than did the animal rights activist. They termed this finding as “relative hostile 
media perception.” However, strictly speaking, this finding may show assimilation bias 
from the animal rights activists’ standpoint because they perceived the article to be biased 
toward them although the degree of perceptual bias was relatively smaller than that of the 
primate-research supporters.  
Another study showed similar results. In another experiment, Gunther et al. 
(2012) showed three types of articles, that is, pro-vaccination, neutral, and anti-
vaccination articles, to two groups: anti-vaccination partisans and a disinterested group. 
They found that, when the anti-vaccination partisans read the neutral article or pro-
vaccination slanted article, these news articles were p rceived to be more biased in the 
pro-vaccination direction compared with the disinterested group, thereby validating the 
existence of hostile media perception. However, when t  anti-vaccination partisans read 
the anti-vaccination slanted article, they perceived the news article to be in favor of their 
group rather than to the pro-vaccination direction. In other words, hostile media 
perception disappeared when the partisans encountered the news article that was 
congenial to their views. Therefore, the authors concluded that hostile media perception 




provide a basis for the assumption that hostile media perception may undergo a change in 
terms of its direction under selective exposure condition, in which people see the news 
coverage slanted toward their views.  
In addition to the body of evidence on the issue, th  theoretical concern between 
selective exposure and hostile media perception should be considered. As the definition 
of selective exposure indicates, selective exposure phenomenon occurs because of 
personal beliefs or predisposition, whereas in the context of political information, it 
would be due to political predisposition. Thus, in almost all research, political 
predisposition has been operationally defined as political partisanship, such as political 
identification or political ideologies (e.g. Garret, 2010; Iyengar, 2010; Stroud, 2008; 
Stroud, 2009; Stroud 2010). Also, as mentioned earlier, involvement has been 
conceptualized as partisanship in hostile media perception studies. Especially, it has been 
operationally defined as political partisanship in the context of political issue, which is 
the same operational definition as political dispositi n in selective exposure. 
The duplication of these two concepts provides a logical reason to predict how 
hostile media perception theory is likely to change. According to selective exposure 
theory, political predisposition is positively related with selective exposure. Also, 
selective exposure might be negatively related withhostile media perception on the basis 
of the literature mentioned earlier. Thus, political predisposition would have a negative 
relationship with hostile media perception. When cosidering that the operational 
definition of political predisposition is identical with involvement in hostile media 
perception, it would be plausible to propose that involvement would have a negative 




involvement in a certain issue are likely to perceive news coverage about that issue as in 
favor of their point of view. However, there is little theoretical and empirical evidence for 




This study is interested in the theoretical change of hostile media perception 
under selective exposure phenomenon, and thus, it first needs to establish the existence of 
selective exposure phenomenon within the sample. As mentioned earlier, some studies 
have documented that selective exposure phenomenon does not exist (e.g., Sears & 
Freedman, 1965; 1967), and debates continue to surrund the existence of selective 
exposure phenomenon. However, recent studies have consistently documented the 
existence of selective exposure phenomenon in various t pics and settings. Therefore, 
H1) People with more strongly held political partisan hip will be more likely to 
select politically congenial media outlets. 
 
Several hostile media perception studies have documented that when people 
encountered media coverage overtly slanted in favor of their point of views, they 




H2) The more people selectively expose themselves to media coverage that is 
agreeable to their political partisanship, the more they would perceive campaign 
media coverage to be in favor of their supporting candidate. 
Selective exposure phenomenon has long been argued to limit the effect of 
persuasive media message on the audience, begging the question what effect selective 
exposure has on hostile media perception theory. The duplication of involvement and 
political predisposition provides underpinnings to predict how selective exposure 
phenomenon influences the change in hostile media perce tion theory. Nonetheless, there 
is little theoretical and empirical evidence to predict the change of relationship between 
involvement and hostile media perception. Thus, the following research question is 
posed : 











This study used data from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES). 
This survey measured media usage, political opinions and beliefs of electorate in the 
United State throughout the 2008 presidential election. One of the biggest advantages of 
this data is that it contains indicators of people’s perception of campaign news coverage 
and measurement for selective exposure phenomenon. The NAES survey is composed of 
two sets of data: telephone and online survey. In this study, however, only the telephone 
survey data will be used for analysis because the measurement of the news coverage 
perception was only included in the telephone survey data. The telephone component is a 
rolling cross-sectional (RCS) survey conducted daily over the course of the 2008 election 
from December 17, 2007 to November 3, 2008. The total number of cases of the 
telephone survey is 56,000.  
Generally, the hostile media perception was measured when the oppositional two 
groups perceive media coverage as biased in favor of the other group’s point of view. 




appeared in the questionnaire. Thus, it needs to limit the candidates up to two in order to 
avoid methodological complexity. To do so, this study only included data collected after 
June 24, when the primary election was finished and candidates for presidential election 
of the two major parties was decided. After all, the otal of the cases used in main 
analysis was 24,942.  
 
Measurement 
Hostile Media Perception. According to the definition of hostile media 
perception, its presence was claimed when a negative relationship was found between 
personal opinion and perceived media coverage (Gunther et al., 2001). Drawing on this 
definition, Choi et al. (2009) invented the measurement by calculating the directional 
distance between one’s perception on news coverage (i.e., perceived media slant) against 
one’s own viewpoint (i.e., personal opinion). This study employed the same method. To 
do so, first, a perceived media slant measurement was constructed. Survey respondents 
who were exposed to the media programs in the past week were asked which presidential 
candidate the media favored during the campaign. Then, the respondents listened to the 
name of each candidate, and evaluated the media slant with a nominal scale. Because of 
number of candidates, there were two dichotomous measur ments. These two 
measurements were united into one measurement and reco ed into 1 and -1. If 
respondents perceived media coverage as biased toward Ob ma, -1 was given. However, 




Second, personal opinion measurement was created using candidate support 
variable. Since the origin questionnaire asked respondents to answer the question about 
how much they supported the candidate who they already selected for support in the 
previous question, there were two measurements for each candidate. These two 
measurements were also summed into one measurement, range from -3 (strongly support  
McCain) to 3 (strongly support Obama).  
Finally the perceived media slant measurement was multiplied by the 
measurement of candidate support. Thus, the constructed measurement for hostile media 
perception was from -3 to 3, in which larger values indicates stronger hostile media 
perception and smaller values indicate lower hostile media perception. The same way 
was applied to the all media types.  
 
Political partisanship. Political partisanship was constructed by combining items 
asking: party identification, strength of party identification, and party leanings (for those 
who did not categorize themselves as partisan). Then sorted into a five point scale: Strong 
Republican, not very strong Republican, not leaning toward either party, not very strong 
Democrat, and strong Democrat. Because political ideology and political party 
attachment were significantly correlate (r = 0.55, p < .01), two variables were summed in 
order to form a single measurement of political partis nship (range from -4 to 4). In this 
measurement, smaller values indicate strong conservative Republican and larger values 




Selective exposure. As mentioned earlier, partisan selective exposure means that 
people selectively view media which is congenial to one’s own political partisanship. 
Thus, to measure selective exposure, it is necessary to match the respondents’ political 
partisanship with media programs they are consuming (Stroud, 2010). In line with this 
logic, the measurement of selective exposure was con tructed through two steps. First, 
media programs were classified by its political leaning. Second, selective exposure was 
constructed by multiplying these two measurements: political partisanship and media 
consumption (range from -4 to 4). In this measurement, smaller values indicate the strong 
selective exposure to the conservative media programs and larger values indicate the 
strong selective exposure to the liberal media programs. Each of the media classifications 
by political leaning was described below.  
 
Television news. Respondents were asked to identify which news program they 
watched most often in the last week. They could choose one among 33 programs from 
‘unspecified ABC’ program (1) to ‘Your world with Neil Cavuto’ (33). Several studies 
suggested a criterion to classify the TV news. Holtzman et al. (2011) examined the media 
bias and found that MSNBC had a liberal bias while Fox News had a conservative bias. 
The CNN news program had a smaller liberal bias compared to MSNBC but it showed a 
greater pro-liberal bias than Fox News. Similarly, Groseclose and Milyo (2005) found 
that CNN News was to the left of FOX News. Drawing on this research, programs from 
Fox News channel was categorized into Republican leing news while CNN and 
MSNBC news programs were categorized into Democrat leaning. To create a 




watched the programs from Fox news channel was given a 1, and respondents watching 
other programs, not watching a TV program, not able to name a program that they 
watched was given a 0. Similarly, to construct a measurement of watching program 
leaning toward liberal, respondents who watched the programs from CNN or MSNBC 
were given a 1, and respondents watching other programs, not watching a TV program, 
not able to name a program that they watched were given a 0. Finally, on the basis of 
content analysis, respondents who watched programs fro  three networks were given a 0.  
 
Newspapers. Survey respondents who read a daily newspaper in the past week 
were asked which newspaper they read most often. Then, t ey were asked to identify the 
newspaper they read among 34 newspapers from ‘Arizona Republic’ (1) to ‘Washington 
Post’ (34). The political leanings of the newspapers were determined based on the 
presidential candidate endorsement in the 2008 presidential election. Several studies 
showed that there was a significant relationship betwe n newspaper endorsements and 
political leaning of the newspaper (Druckman & Parkin, 2005; Kahn & Kenney, 2002). 
Also, using newspaper endorsements to measure political eanings were used in previous 
literatures (Stround, 2008;  2010). To determine newspaper endorsement, public 
information sources (e.g. Editor & Publisher) was used. Again, two dichotomous 
measurements were created. To create a measurement of r ading newspapers leaning 
toward conservative, respondents who read a newspaper endorsing McCain were given a 
1, and respondents reading another newspaper, not reading a newspaper, and not able to 




newspaper endorsing Obama were given a 1, and respondents reading another newspaper, 
not reading a newspaper, and not able to name a newspaper that they read were given a 0. 
 
Political talk radio. Respondents reporting that they listened to talk radio in the 
past week were asked to identify the radio shows they listened to. Respondents then 
chose a program among 22 programs from ‘All things considered’ (1) to ‘Schlessinger 
Laura’ (22). The talk radio programs were coded based on the ideological affiliations 
classified by trade magazines, or the way previous research classified the programs (e.g. 
Stroud, 2008). Again two dichotomous variables were constructed in the same way as TV 
news program or newspapers. Thus, to create a measurement of listening to a talk radio 
leaning toward conservative, respondents who listened to a talk radio affiliated to 
conservatives were given a 1, and respondents listening to another talk radio, not 
listening to a talk radio, and not able to name a talk radio were given a 0. Also, to 
construct a measurement of listening to a talk radio leaning toward liberal, respondents 
who listened to a talk radio affiliated to liberals were given a 1, and other cases were 
given a 0.  
 
Political websites. Survey respondents who accessed information about the 
campaign for the 2008 presidential election via inter et websites were asked which sites 
they visited most often. Then, they were asked to ientify the site among 31 sites from 
‘ABC News.com’ (1) to ‘YouTube’ (31). Political websites were coded as liberal or 




websites were coded based on the ideological leaning of the news organization. Also, 
candidate websites followed the same way. Again, two dichotomous variables were made 
in the same way as other media outlets. 
 
Controls. Demographic variables such as gender, age, education and income 
were controlled. Also, the media usage variable was used as controls for analysis of 
hostile media perception. Political knowledge and political interest were controlled for 
the analysis of selective exposure. On the basis of a previous study (Thorson, 2012), 
political knowledge were constructed by summing up 5 questions about the specific 
issues in the 2008 election. Respondents answered questions about whether particular 












Table 1. Variable and Coding  
Variable Coding 
Political partisanship 
-4 (Strong conservative Republican) to 4 (Strong liberal 
Democrat) 
Candidate favored by TV news 
Obama: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
McCain: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Candidate favored by Talk radio 
Obama: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
McCain: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Candidate favored by Newspaper 
Obama: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
McCain: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Candidate favored by Online site 
Obama: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
McCain: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
TV program most frequently watched 1 (ABC) to 33 (Your World with Neil Cavuto) 
Talk radio most frequently listened to  1 (All things considered) to 22 (Schlessinger Laura) 
Newspaper most frequently read 1 (Arizona Republic) to 34 (Washington Post) 
Online site most frequently visited 1 (ABC News.com) to 31 (YouTube) 
Degree of support 
1 (Definitely will vote for candidate) to 3 (Good chance will 
change mind) 
Hostile media perception 
-3 (Low hostile media perception) to 3 (High hostile media 
perception) 
Media consumption (TV) 
Liberal: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Conservative: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Media consumption (Radio) 
Liberal: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Conservative: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Media consumption (Newspaper) 
Liberal: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Conservative: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Media consumption (Website) 
Liberal: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Conservative: 1 (Yes) to 0 (N0) 
Selective exposure 
-4 (Selectively expose to conservative media) to 4 (Selectively 
expose to liberal media) 
Age 18 to 97 
Gender 1 (Male) to 0 (Female) 
Income 1 (Less than 10.000) to 9 (150.000 or more) 
Education 1 (Grade 8 or lower) to 9 (Graduate or prfessional degree) 
Media usage 0 to7 
Political knowledge 0 to 5 










Hypothesis 1 aimed to substantiate the existence of s lective exposure 
phenomenon within the survey sample. To verify Hypothesis 1, logistic regression 
analyses were conducted across all media types. Table 2 shows that people who have 
more strong conservative Republican partisanship tend to watch conservative TV news 
programs, such as Fox News, this finding is statistically significant including all control 
variables (B = -0.422, p < 0.01). Conversely, liberal Democrats are more likly to watch 
liberal TV news programs (B = 0.472, p < 0.01). In addition, political partisanship is 
significantly related to consumption of media type. Conservative Republicans are more 
likely to read newspapers endorsing McCain (B = -0.208, p < 0.01), listen to conservative 
radio talk shows (B=-0.716, p<0.01), and access conservative political websites (B = -
0.499, p < 0.01). Meanwhile, liberal Democrats tend to read newspapers endorsing 
Obama (B = 0.253, p < 0.01), listen to liberal radio (B = 0.752, p < 0.01), and access 
liberal websites (B = 0.184, p < 0.01). Hence, the results showed that selective exposure 




Table 2. Logistic regression analyses of media exposure by political partisanship 
 














Gender -.039 -.164** -.062 -.289** .427** -.507** .131 .197** 
Age .006** -.005** -.002 .007 .018** -.015** -.014** -.010** 
Income -.017 -.035* -.098* .038 -.045 .038 .012 .087** 
Education -.086** .070** -.088* .036 -.219** .244** -.001 .109** 
Media 
usage 
-.063** -.034 -.026 .041 -.025 .012 .102** .103** 
Political 
interest 
-.065 -.227** -.188 -.065 .225* -.304** .563** .265** 
Political 
knowledge 
-.028 -.039 -.011 -.001 -.243** .242** .125* .051 
Political 
partisanship 
-.422** .472** -.208** .253** -.716** .752** -.499** .184** 
Nagelkerke 
R-square 
.231 .322 .059 .106 .604 .626 .198 .115 
Notes : Dependent variable is media consumption of each media outlet. 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
Media usage means usage of TV news, newspaper, talk adio, and political internet 






Hypothesis 2 proposes that selective exposure would have a negative correlation 
with hostile media perception. In other words, the more the people expose themselves to 
campaign media coverage that supports their political predisposition, the more they 
would perceive such media coverage to be in favor of their nominee. To substantiate 
Hypothesis 2, multiple regression analyses were conducted including all controls. Model 
1 in Table 3 indicates that people who selectively watch conservative TV news tend to 
show a low degree of hostile media perception at a statistically significant level (β = -
.116, p < 0.01). Also, Model 2 shows that the more people se ctively expose themselves 
to liberal TV news, the more they perceive the news coverage to be in favor of their 
nominee (β = -0.093,  p < 0.01).  
The same was true of radio talk shows and political websites. Selective exposure 
to conservative radio shows and political websites had a significant negative relationship 
with hostile media perception (β = -0.237, p < 0.01 and β = -0.092, p < 0.01, 
respectively). Selective exposure to liberal counterparts of the above also had statistically 
significant negative correlation with hostile media perception (β = -0.072, p < 0.05 and β 
= -0.103, p < 0.01, respectively). However, this tendency disappeared in the case of 
selective exposure to conservative newspaper. People who selectively read conservative 
newspapers are more likely to perceive the newspaper cov rage to be biased against their 
supporting candidate, although not at a statistically significant level (β = 0.02, p= 0.501). 






Table 3. Regression analyses of hostile media percetion by selective exposure 


















Gender .028 -.057 -.042 -.050 Gender .036 .011 -.041 -.035 
Age -.036 .074* -.052 -.039 Age -.064* .038 -.107** -.042 
Income .006 .071* .016 .053 Income -.049 .014 -.041 .029 
Education -.098** -.137** -.034 -.081** Education -.065* -.040 .047 -.066* 
Media 
usage 
.025 -.099** .012 -.003 Media 
usage 










-.071** -.388** -.116** -.185** 
Notes : Dependent variable is hostile media perception of each media outlet. 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
Media usage means usage of TV news, newspaper, talk adio, and political internet 
respectively according to the dependent variable. 
In order to the analysis, selective exposure measurment was separate and recoded. Thus, 
two selective exposure measurements were constructed: selective exposure to 
conservative media programs (range from 0 to 4), selective exposure to liberal media 
programs (range from 0 to 4). In these two measurements, larger values indicate the 






Research question 1 asks how the relationship between political partisanship and 
hostile media perception changes. As confirmed by the multiple regression analysis 
model, Table 3 shows that people who have a strong c servative Republican political 
partisanship are more likely to perceive TV news as being congenial to their supporting 
candidate at a statistically significant level (β = -0.080, p < 0.01). Also, people with 
strong liberal Democrat political partisanship tend to show a low degree of hostile media 
perception (β = -0.085, p < 0.01). Similar results were found in other media types. The 
more the people had strong partisanship, the more they tended to perceive the radio talk 
shows to which they listen to be in favor of their nominee; this was true for both 
Republicans and Democrats (β = -0.317, p < 0.01 and β = -0.202, p < 0.01, respectively). 
The same could be said regarding political websites (β = -0.108, p < 0.01 and β = -0.183, 
p < 0.01). As such, unlike previous findings, political partisanship has a negative 
correlation with hostile media perception. However, this tendency was not supported in 
the case of conservative Republicans exposed to conservative newspapers. People with 
strongly held conservative Republican political partis nship perceive newspaper coverage 









Table 4. Regression analyses of hostile media percetion by involvement 



















Gender .056* .059* -.011 .040 Gender .007 -.012 -.142** -.004 
Age -.019 -.008 -.085** -.087* Age -.021 .083** .075 -.018 
Income -.058* .032 -.061* -.008 Income -.030 -.010 .078 -.005 
Education -.020 -.064* .028 -.050 Education -.076* -.045 -.039 -.045 
Media 
usage 
-.017 -.026 .000 .041 Media 
usage 





-.080** .153** -.317** -.108** Partisanship 
(Liberal 
Democrat) 
-.085** -.110** -.202** -.183** 
Notes : Dependent variable is hostile media perception of each media outlet. 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
Media usage means usage of TV news, newspaper, talk adio, and political internet 
respectively according to the dependent variable. 
In order to the analysis, political partisanship measurement was separate and recoded. 
Thus, two political partisanship measurements were constructed: partisanship to 
conservative Republican (range from 0 to 4), partisnship to liberal Democrat (range 







Apart from the research question, an additional anaysis was conducted using 
multiple regression models with the interaction term between political partisanship and 
selective exposure in order to confirm the effect of selective exposure on hostile media 
perception theory. Table 5 shows that when the level of selective exposure to 
conservative TV news was low, strong conservative Republican partisans perceived TV 
news to be biased against their nominee (β = -0.211, p < 0.01). Similarly, political 
partisanship had a positive correlation with hostile media perception, when the level of 
selective exposure to conservative newspapers (β = -0.119, p < 0.05), radio talk shows (β 
= -0.113, p < 0.01), and political websites (β = -0.181, p < 0.01) decreased. However, the 
interaction effect on hostile media perception disappeared among the Democrats, except 













Table 5. Regression analyses of hostile media perception by partisanship and selective exposure 



















Gender .053 .100* .015 .039 Gender .046 -.034 -.142* -.006 
Age -.053 -.040 -.110** -.112* Age -.072 .054 .108 -.019 
Income -.030 -.010 -.041 -.007 Income -.194 .003 .117 -.003 
Education -.068* -.118* .036 -.044 Education .238* -.024 -.157* -.044 
Media 
usage 
.026 -.083 -.004 .057 Media 
usage 





-.144** .185** -.429** -.048 Partisanship 
(Liberal 
Democrat) 













-.211** -.119* -.113** -.181** partisanship 
* Selective 
exposure 
-.042 -.088 -.417** -.076 
Notes : Dependent variable is hostile media perception. 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
Media usage means usage of TV news, newspaper, talk adio, and political internet 











This study aimed to explore how hostile media perception theory would change 
under selective exposure phenomenon. The development of communications technology 
and the growth in the number and variety of news outlets has created a fragmented 
information environment, which has resurrected selectiv  exposure phenomenon. Several 
findings and theoretical conflicts imply the change of hostile media perception theory. To 
investigate the change, two hypotheses and one research question were proposed. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted the existence of selective exposure phenomenon. Although the 
existence of selective exposure is still debated, many studies have recently documented 
its existence. Results of the current study showed that selective exposure phenomenon 
existed during the 2008 presidential elections. This result is consistent with findings of 
recent research in which selective exposure was supported throughout all types of media. 
However, the robustness of the results for the relationship among political 
predisposition, newspaper consumption, and political website visit was relatively small 




is the limited access to newspapers that publish agree ble articles. In many communities, 
only a single newspaper exists, and consumers have limit d opportunity to subscribe to 
non-local papers (Stroud, 2008). Thus, if people liv in a community with likeminded 
members, they may be more likely to consume newspapers that cater to their opinions. 
However, if people live in a community that does not share their political partisanship, 
the chance for them to consume an agreeable newspaper is likely to decrease. As a result, 
this limited availability may reduce selective exposure to newspaper. The low correlation 
between political partisanship and political website visit needs another explanation. 
According to several studies, people may use the Internet to explore diverse opinions. For 
instance, Stromer-Galley (2003) found that people discussing politics online tend not to 
mention that they purposefully seek views that are congenial to their views and avoid 
counter-attitudinal views. Thus, this characteristic of Internet users lowers selective 
exposure in political websites. However, all these xplanations could be verified only 
through additional studies.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted the negative correlation betwe n selective exposure and 
hostile media perception. Much research about hostile media perception has been 
conducted in the context of balanced news (Gunther, 2012). Partisans tend to perceive 
balanced news coverage as biased toward other groups. What if people are exposed to 
news coverage agreeable to their own views, rather than balanced news? Several studies 
showed that, when participants were lead to encounter overtly slanted news in the 
direction of their own position, hostile media perception does not occur. Based on these 
findings, Hypothesis 2 was suggested, and the results howed that the more the people 




they have hostile perception of the coverage. This result is also consistent with previous 
findings.  
However, this tendency was not supported among Republicans who selectively 
exposed themselves to politically congruent newspapers. One possible explanation is the 
limited availability to such newspapers. As mentioned earlier, the opportunity to 
subscribe to various papers is limited. Thus, even when people live in a community with 
likeminded newspaper, they could feel that the paper leans far from their political 
partisanship. In other words, if a person with very st ong conservative Republican 
political inclination could not help reading a newspaper that is congruent with his 
political views, but not so strongly compared with his political partisanship, then that 
person perceives the newspaper as biased against his own views, even if the person is 
defined as one who selectively exposed to a politica ly congruent newspaper. However, 
this explanation still cannot explain why only people who selectively expose themselves 
to conservative newspapers have high hostile media perception.  
The most interesting and important finding was the c ange of relationship 
between political partisanship and hostile media perception. Research question asks what 
change the hostile media effect would undergo under the selective exposure phenomenon. 
The results showed that people with strong partisanship tend to perceive news coverage 
as in favor of their nominee, rather than biased against. Many previous studies have 
documented that political partisanship has a positive correlation with hostile media 
perception. As mentioned above, the result could be understood from the duplication of 
concept of involvement and political predisposition. Selective exposure theory has 




the literatures predicted that selective exposure would be negatively related with hostile 
media perception, which means political predispositi n would have a negative 
relationship with hostile media perception. When cosidering that the operational 
definition of political predisposition is identical with involvement in hostile media 
perception, it could be a reasonable result that involvement would have a negative 
relationship with hostile media perception.  
Nonetheless, an opposite result was obtained for newspapers. Republicans with 
strong partisanship showed a tendency to evaluate the newspapers they read as biased 
against their candidate. The reason may be explained in association with the Hypothesis 
2. The results of Hypothesis 2 showed that selectiv exposure to conservative newspapers 
had a positive relationship with hostile media perception, which could mean positive 
correlation between political predisposition and hostile media perception. The results of 
research question 1was explained based on the negative relationship between selective 
exposure and hostile media perception. Thus, it is a natural result that partisans may have 
hostile media perception when they perceive news coverage as hostile although they are 
selectively exposed to politically congruent media coverage.  
An addition analysis was conducted to determine whether or not the reason of the 
change in hostile media perception could be selectiv  exposure phenomenon. The results 
showed that the effect of political partisanship on h stile media perception would differ 
by the degree of selective exposure. Republicans with a strong political partisanship 
perceived TV news to be biased against their nominee, but only when the level of 




direction of correlation between partisanship and hostile media perception is influenced 
by selective exposure.  
However, it should be noted that a sharp difference was observed between 
Republicans and Democrats. The interaction effect only appeared among conservative 
Republicans. One explanation may be the influence of the atmosphere of the campaign. 
In a gubernatorial election, Huge and Glynn (2010) found that Democrats’ hostile 
perception increasingly decreased, whereas that of the Republican’s persisted. They 
attributed the non-equivalence to the atmosphere of the campaign. They explained that 
when the Democrats’ candidate held a lead, this group may quell the fear that biased 
coverage could influence other voters, which resultd in the decrease of hostile media 
perception. Their explanation could be applied to the current study. In the 2008 
presidential elections, Obama held a lead from the outset, which became larger as the 
election approached (Kenski et al., 2010). In this situation, Democrats perceived the 
campaign news coverage to be in favor of Obama regardless of whether they were 
exposed to politically congruent media or not. However, this explanation could only be 
justified by additional study.  
 
Implication 
This research has an implication for the theoretical refinement of hostile media 
perception. Hostile media perception has been studied in the psychological academic 
realm. Thus, people have been assumed to perceive nws coverage to be biased toward 




involvement in a certain issue. The theory has had strong explanatory power to the media 
environment, in which three major networks dominated the media market and featured 
balanced news (Gunther, 2012). However, the change in the media environment exposes 
people to ideologically congruent media coverage. Extensive studies have predicted the 
influence of selective exposure phenomenon on existing theories, and the present study 
revealed that the mechanism of hostile media perception has changed. The results showed 
that people with high involvement in a certain issue tend to see media coverage to be in 
favor of their point of view, which is totally opposite of the result compared with 
previous theories. Nonetheless, many experimental studies about hostile media 
perception have not captured the change as they have been conducted without 
considering the effect of selective exposure phenomenon. Thus, the current study has a 
theoretical implication for hostile media perception theory in that the mechanism of 
hostile media perception theory could change when considering the media consumption. 
In addition to theoretical implication, the results of this study also have an 
implication for the role of media in a democracy. According to persuasive press inference 
theory, people infer public opinion from their percption of media coverage because of 
their assumption that media has a substantial influe ce on others (Gunther, 2001). Thus, 
if partisans perceive the media coverage to be in favor of other groups, they are prone to 
infer that the climate of opinion would be more favorable to other groups. As a result, 
hostile media perception has a role in reducing such projection, which refers to partisans’ 
misjudgment of opinion dynamics whereby partisans perceive public opinion as more 
favorable to their own point of view (Gunther, 2001). When considering the literature 




Neumann, 1977), the increasing of projection among partisans would be concluded as 
reinforcement of existing attitude, opinion polarizt on. Thus, the results of the current 
study would imply an ever-worsening polarization in society, as the selective exposure to 
politically congruent media outlets is growing over time (e.g., Stroud, 2008). In this 




The current study is limited by several factors. First is the nature of the secondary 
data. Although the data contained questions on selective exposure and hostile media 
perception, the data still suffered from validity of measurement. For example, when 
selective exposure to TV news was measured, the questionnaire asked the respondents 
regarding their most-watched program, not on all the programs that they watched. This 
manner of measurement has a flaw of not capturing the complex pattern of information 
consumption. Specifically, a person with a Democrati  leaning may mostly watch CNN 
and MSNBC based on political ideology, but the person can also watch Fox News for any 
reason. In this situation, the current questionnaire opts to classify the person as one who 
is selectively exposed. 
Second is the problem in the classification of media programs. As mentioned 
earlier, classifying media programs into conservative and liberal is necessary to measure 
selective exposure. The current study sorted the programs based on a previous research; 




previous studies classified CNN as a liberal media outlet, but did not provide guidelines 
for specific CNN programs. Thus, all programs from CNN were classified as liberal 
programs regardless of their unique characteristics. As a result, the current study could 
not reflect the characteristics of each program. The correlation between the political 
leaning of a TV channel and its program has been documented (Groeling, 2008; 
Groseclose & Milyo, 2005; Holtzman et al., 2011). Nonetheless, the classification of the 
current study is still vulnerable to the exception.  
The third limitation has to do with the question of causality. This study showed 
that exposure to ideological media is associated with a decrease in hostile media 
perception. However, hostile media perception can arguably lead people to seek exposure 
to politically congruent media. This explanation is inconsistent with the recent findings 
that, while people do not actively avoid incongruent or disconfirming channels, they have 
a strong preference to expose themselves to ideologica ly congruent news outlets 
(Garrett, 2009). Nonetheless, the findings could not justify the current study because the 
question about reverse causality could only be answered by further research. 
 
Future research 
Although the current study revealed the change of mechanism of hostile media 
perception theory, there still are many topics which need more research. First, it needs to 
scrutinize the characteristics of media consumers. The results of the current study showed 
that the selective exposure phenomenon differed by media outlets. Also, the people’s 




could be explained in the context of the characteristics of media outlets; however, the 
difference could come from the difference of media consumers themselves. For example, 
Pfau, Houston, and Semmler (2007) found difference of media usage between 
Republicans and Democrats. They documented that Republicans gravitated to talk radio 
whereas Democrats tuned into television, news magazines, and late-night entertainment 
television. Also, younger generations are more and more using an online source to get 
news while the older generation still adheres to tradi ional media such as television and 
newspaper (PEW, 2012). Given this shift, selective exposure and its effect on existing 
theory should be studied along with different media consumption patterns. 
Second, the reverse causality question should be solv d. Some can still argue that 
hostile media perception would cause people to select m dia program congenial to their 
point of view though recent findings negate the reve se causality between selective 
exposure and hostile media perception. Thus, this problem should be solved with 
sophisticated research design such as longitudinal analysis.  
Third, the subsequent effect of the change of hostile media perception theory 
needs to be studied. As mentioned above, the change of hostile media perception theory 
could accelerate the opinion polarization. However, this prediction was only based on the 
logical reasoning, so it needs to be studied with empirical data. Although debates about 
the effect of selective exposure phenomenon on existing theories continues to be as 
vigorous as ever, it still remains on the effect on theory itself. However, more the 
important thing would be the concerns about the effct on democracy, considering that all 
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